IoT and SCADA Security Breakdown: The Bowman Avenue Dam Case Study

Insight:

In the current environment, modern dam control systems are using IoT technologies such as smart sensors, PLCs, remote access gateways and cloud-based dashboards to improve operational efficiency and real time monitoring. But because of that connectivity, they become susceptible to serious cybersecurity threats, turning critical infrastructure into targets of modern warfare. using weakness of weak authentication, unpatched firmware or unsecured communication protocols to access, manipulate dam operations, turn off alarms or launch coordinated cyber physical attacks. These IoT based intrusions can lead to catastrophic flooding, disrupt emergency response or synchronized with kinetic strikes in hybrid warfare scenarios. As such, protecting such system requires multi layered security approach including network segmentation, zero trust architecture, encrypted communication, firmware validation and continuous monitoring with AI driven anomaly detection.

Let’s understand by Case-study of the Bowman Avenue Dam under vulnerable attack of 2013

 The Bowman Avenue Dam under vulnerable attack back in 2013. The SCADA was exposed to the web and wasn’t secured properly. Iranian hackers used Shodan.io to scan the internet for publicly exposed ICS devices and Nmap or ZMap to find open services. Once they came across the dam’s control system, they were aware that the system used weak or default login credentials, and they can log in remotely without any authentication or any multi-factor protection. They enter with a read-only access and could see some water levels and gate status. They couldn’t open the floodgate because it was physically disconnected for maintenance; however, they could have seen some internal network topology, IP schema and potentially have gained sensitive operational information. Without any firewalls, intrusion detection systems and proper network segmentation between IT/OT environments they could have sit in the system for a long time without being detected; how exposed infrastructure connected to the internet can be a backdoor for state sponsored cyber-attacks.

Lesson learning from The Bowman Avenue Dam under vulnerable attack:

This vulnerability is a lesson to be learned from The Bowman Avenue Dam; The 2013 Bowman Avenue Dam cyberattack is an elementary case related to the threats and vulnerabilities of modern infrastructure in an age of interconnected digital systems. The attack illustrates the fact that exposing industrial control systems like SCADA to the public internet without basic security such as firewalls, network segmentation and encrypted communication is a big fat hole for attackers to ransom. That “” could find and access the dam’s control interface using publicly available tools like Shodan and default or weak login credentials represents a failure of cybersecurity hygiene and secure-by-design approaches. In this incident, there was no differentiation between IT and OT environment; designed based on an assumption that the systems are isolated facilitated the attacker to move sideways meaningfully and manipulate systems easily as a result of the breach, proving that real-time threat detection is no longer a choice; it’s a must. Spreading further as a grand strategy. This example revealed how cyber is becoming a strategy weapon for nation-states, where infrastructure is attacked not only to disrupt people’s lives but also as a tool for political pressure or psychological operations. The dam’s gate was offline during the attack, but similar physical principles resulted in similar consequences and not potential outcomes as a physical terrorist act. the lesson is easy enough: cybersecurity isn’t about reacting to an attacker but about proactively deferring one the cybersecurity approach must-layout as a fundamental layer in critical infrastructure from procurement design to daily operation and lifecycle management. This Bowman case should serve as a reminder that cyber is a catastrophe prevention core that this incident could have been predicted from day one.

What is IOT hacking?

The term Internet of Things hacking’ refers to attacks on the devices and systems that comprise the Internet of Things —smart cameras and thermostats, industrial sensors, wearables, home appliances, and more. These devices are assaulted by to install other devices, steal data, gain control, transport side-ward to the remainder of the network, recruit devices into botnets, conduct DDoS operations, or hack physical processes. The most typical and infamous root causes are hence predictable based on the already mentioned: weak or default passwords, sky ware that has not been updated, an exposed range of management interfaces as a criminal or a few combinations combine several flooring of access to the planned targets to attain the task, unencrypted network infrastructure, and cloud-API, brief: the attackers can begin with devices misusing a communicated API and then put the rest in place. The best defenses are those that reduce the targets and increase the rivals: use nonstandard settings, firmware updates using-signed keys and patches use encryption, strong device identities, ratification devices through the network and grant them simple access to it to instruct them to reject diff networks access to it reject networks. Disable unused services and examine and inspect regularly since you are less influenced.

MQTT -- Message Queuing Telemetry Transport

It is a lightweight publish/subscribe messaging protocol widely used in IoT because it works well over low-bandwidth, unreliable, or high-latency networks.

It is used for communication between a server and the IoT sensors. MQTT is also known as publish/subscribe protocol.

Here we have two types of devices:
1. MQTT clients
2. MQTT Brokers or servers

How MQTT is working?

• Client A that can be a publisher which it connects to the broker TCP protocol; optionally, TLS can be used for more security.

• Client A is sending a message to topic sensors/room1/temp with an exact QoS of delivery.

• The broker is looking for all clients subscribed to sensors/room1/temp protocol name in the message and all wildcard matches and delivers the message to all these clients. The message is sent/received from Client B and Client C.

  Conclusion:

The Bowman Avenue Dam cyberattack highlights the need for strong cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. A small internet exposed system was used by basic tools and weak credentials by nation state actors. Bad network design, no monitoring, and no cyber security best practices can turn into national security risks. A call for proactive layered defense and secure by design architecture in the modern threat environment to keep services to the public safe. wakeup call for modern IOT based infrastructure. Need of strong cybersecurity to safeguard it.